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SUMMARY 
 
Hydrocarbon explosion and fire are typical accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry, sometimes with catastrophic 
consequences such as casualties, property damage and pollution. Successful engineering and design should meet both 
functional requirements associated with operability in normal conditions and health, safety, environmental and ergonomics 
(HSE&E) requirements associated with accidental and extreme conditions. A risk-based approach is best for successful design 
and engineering to meet HSE&E requirements. This study aimed to develop an advanced procedure for assessing the 
quantitative risk of offshore installations in explosions. Unlike existing industry practices based on prescriptive rules or 
qualitative approaches, the proposed procedure uses an entirely probabilistic approach. The procedure starts with probabilistic 
selection of accident scenarios. As the defining components of risk, both the frequency and consequences associated with 
selected accident scenarios are computed using the most refined technologies. Probabilistic technology is then applied to 
establish the relationship between the probability of exceedance and the physical values of the accident. Acceptance risk 
criteria can be applied to define the nominal values of design and/or level of risk. To validate and demonstrate the applicability 
of the proposed procedure, an example of its application to topside structures of an FPSO unit subjected to hydrocarbon 
explosions is detailed. The conclusions and insights obtained are documented. 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics 
CV Control Volume 
DLF Dynamic Load Factor 
FE Finite Element 
FEA Finite Element Analysis 
FLACS FLame ACceleration Simulator 
FLNG Floating Liquefied Natural Gas 
FPSO Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading 
HSE&E Health, Safety, Environmental and 
Ergonomics 
IP Ignition Probability 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
NLFEM Nonlinear Finite Element Method 
SDOF Single Degree of Freedom 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
ACV Minimum area around the leak (mm
2
) 
Aleak Leak area (mm
2
) 
C Cowper-Symonds coefficient (1/s) 
E Elastic modulus (MPa) 
I Ignition probability (-) 
max.CV Maximum size of CV (m
3
) 
q Cowper-Symonds coefficient 
Vgas Gas cloud volume (m
3
) 
x Leak rate (kg/s). 
εf Fracture strain under static load (-) 
εfd Fracture strain under dynamic load (-) 
  Strain rate (1/s) 
ν Poisson’s ratio (-) 
ρ Density (kg/m3) 
σY Yield stress under static load (MPa) 
σYd Yield stress under dynamic load (MPa) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of different types of accidental and extreme 
events can occur while ships and offshore installations are in 
service as shown in Figure 1 (Paik, 2015). Hydrocarbon 
explosion and fire are two of the most typical types of 
accidents associated with offshore installations, and they 
sometimes result in catastrophic consequences leading to 
casualties, property damage and pollution. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Different types of accidental and extreme 
events involving ships and offshore installations while in 
service (Paik, 2015) 
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Successful engineering and design should meet not only 
functional requirements but also HSE&E requirements. 
Functional requirements address operability in normal 
conditions, and HSE&E requirements represent safe 
performance and integrity in accidental and extreme 
conditions. Normal conditions can usually be 
characterised by a solely linear approach, but more 
sophisticated approaches need to be applied to accidental 
and extreme conditions involving highly nonlinear 
responses as shown in Figure 2 (Paik et al., 2014). The 
risk-based approach is known to be the best method for 
successful design and engineering to meet the HSE&E 
requirements against accidental and extreme conditions. 
 
In the existing practices, methods for risk assessment are 
usually prescriptive (predefined or deterministic) 
(FABIG, 1996; API, 2006; ABS, 2013; DNVGL, 2014). 
Although they are useful when performing explosion risk 
assessment, a fully probabilistic approach takes centre 
stage and reduces uncertainties from human error 
(Czujko, 2001; Vinnem, 2007; NORSOK, 2010; Paik 
and Czujko, 2010; Paik, 2011; ISO, 2014; LR, 2014). 
 
Safe Performance and 
Integrity in Extreme and 
Accidental Conditions
Functional Requirements
Operability in 
Normal Conditions
CLICK TO ADD TEXT.
Linear/Simple Mechanism
HSE&E Requirements
Nonlinear/Complex Mechanism
Probabilistic and Risk-Based 
Approach
Prescriptive Approach
 
Figure 2: Paradigm change in engineering and design 
(Paik et al., 2014) 
 
 
The aim of this study is to develop an advanced 
procedure for the quantitative risk assessment of offshore 
installations in explosions, taking advantage of an 
entirely probabilistic approach. 
 
The proposed procedure starts with the selection of 
accident scenarios based on the probabilistic approach. 
Then, simulations are performed using CFD and NLFEM 
to calculate the structural consequences. 
 
As risk is defined as the product of frequency and 
consequence, the probabilistic technology can further be 
applied to establish the relationship representing the 
probability of exceedance versus the physical values of 
the accident. Finally, acceptance risk criteria can be 
applied to define nominal values of design and/or the 
level of risk. 
 
In the present study, an applied example to topside 
structures of a FPSO unit subjected to hydrocarbon 
explosions is shown in detail to validate and demonstrate 
the applicability of the proposed procedure. 
 
2. AN ADVANCED PROCEDURE FOR 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
EXPLOSIONS 
 
In contrast to a prescriptive approach, the advanced 
procedure for risk assessment of explosions on offshore 
platforms proposed in this study uses an entirely 
probabilistic approach for reliable risk assessment in 
explosions. 
 
Figure 3 presents the suggested procedure for 
quantitative risk assessment and management of an 
offshore installation against explosions. 
 
In comparison with fires, hydrocarbon explosions can 
occur when a gas cloud combining with oxygen is ignited. 
Thus, gas dispersion must be considered before selecting 
explosion scenarios and simulations. 
 
This procedure adopts a probabilistic approach to select 
gas dispersion and explosion scenarios. It can be divided 
into 11 steps defined as follows: 
 
1) Selection of offshore structure type 
2) Characterisation of topology 
3) Selection of gas dispersion scenarios 
4) Investigation of gas cloud characteristics 
5) Selection of gas explosion scenarios 
6) Investigation of blast loads 
7) Calculation of gas explosion frequency 
8) Definition of nominal explosion value 
9) Nonlinear structural consequence analysis 
10) Risk calculation 
11) Decision making 
 
To investigate the gas cloud characteristics, blast loads 
and structural response, this procedure adopts an 
experimental test and/or CFD and NLFEM. In addition, 
the actual blast loads are applied to structural 
consequence analysis in the procedure using the interface 
between CFD/experiment and NLFEM. 
 
Finally, risk is calculated using the structural 
consequence and probability of explosion scenarios, and 
decision making is conducted with acceptance criteria 
based on ALARP risk. 
 
3.  VALIDATION OF CFD AND FE 
MODELLING TECHNIQUES 
 
Before performing the CFD simulation and FEA, 
validations of modelling techniques are needed. In this 
part, comparisons of results between ‘CFD and 
experiment’, and ‘FEA and experiment’ respectively. 
 
3.1 VALIDATION OF CFD MODELLING 
 
Large-scaled explosion experimental tests were 
conducted by the Korea Ship and Offshore Research 
Institute at Pusan National University, Korea. 
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Figure 3: The advanced procedure for quantitative explosion risk assessment and management  
 
 
Figure 4 shows target structure which is a module on 
offshore installation in the test and CFD simulation. 
 
 
 
xy
z
 
(a) Test model (b) CFD model 
Figure 4: Target structures for validation of CFD 
simulation 
 
 
Figure 5 presents the comparison of results of experiment 
and CFD simulation. From Figure 5(a), it can be seen 
that CFD modelling technique is in a good agreement 
with the test. 
 
Also, Figure 5(b) which illustrates test versus simulated 
results for maximum overpressure shows that CFD 
modelling technique is proper. The limit of ±30% for 
under- and over-prediction suggested by Pedersen and 
Middha (2012) are considered as values to be reasonable. 
 
CFD simulation
Experiment
Observation point 7
 
Experiment = CFD simulation
+30% limit
-30% limit
 
(a) Overpressure-time 
history 
(b) Max. overpressures 
Figure 5: Comparison of explosion loads between test 
and CFD simulation 
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With the result of comparison, it seems that the validated 
modelling technique is appropriate. And it is applied 
further CFD simulations in the present study. 
 
 
3.2 VALILDATION OF FE MODELLING 
 
HSE (2003) performed a test of blast wall considering a 
blast pulse loading. The test by HSE (2003) is adopted to 
compare a result of NLFEA for the validation. 
 
The target structure is a blast wall on offshore platform 
as shown in Figure 6. It consists of corrugated panels and 
support members to connect decks. 
 
Primary framework
(upper deck)
Angles comprising
connection
Corrugations
I-beam representing primary framework
 
Figure 6: Target structure for validation of FE analysis 
(HSE, 2003) 
 
Figure 7 descries the structural response under the blast 
pulse load by experimental test and NLFEA. The 
comparison shows that the FE modelling techniques 
developed in this study is proper to perform a structural 
analysis considering explosion loads. 
 
 
NLFEA (ANSYS/LS-DYNA)
 
Figure 7: Comparison of structural response between test 
and NLFEA under the blast pulse load  
 
 
4. AN APPLIED EXAMPLE TO TOPSIDE 
STRUCTURE OF A FPSO 
 
A hypothetical FLNG vessel topside module is selected 
as a target structure for the applied examples including 
definition of explosion load, structural analysis and 
structural assessment. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 present the layout of very large crude oil 
carrier class FLNG, and the layout and principal 
dimensions of the target structure. It is composed of three 
decks (process, mezzanine and upper decks), blast wall 
and process units (vessel and pipes).  
 
Flare tower
Accommodations
 
Figure 8: Layout of the FLNG installation 
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(Plated deck)
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(Grated deck with porosity of 0.9)
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(Plated deck)
Blast wall
 
Figure 9: Layout and principal dimensions of the target 
structure 
 
4.1 ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSION LOADS 
 
4.1 (a) Selection of Gas Dispersion Scenarios and 
Simulations 
 
When defining explosion loads using the prescriptive or 
qualitative approaches, gas dispersion simulation is not 
mandatory. In contrast, gas dispersion simulations with 
dispersion scenarios must be conducted before the selection 
of explosion scenarios and analysis in the probabilistic 
assessment for obtaining the explosion loads. 
 
When selecting gas dispersion scenarios, all possible 
parameters that can have an effect on the gas dispersion 
associated with the operating conditions should be 
considered. Gas dispersions can also be affected by 
environmental conditions, notably wind direction and 
speed (Paik and Czujko, 2010). 
 
In this study, the method of selecting gas dispersion 
scenarios proposed by Paik and Czujko (2010) is used 
with seven parameters: wind direction, wind speed, leak 
rate, leak direction and leak position in the X, Y and Z 
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directions. Fifty gas dispersion scenarios selected by the 
probabilistic approach and sampling technique are shown 
in Table A.1. 
 
For both dispersion and explosion simulations, the 
FLACS developed by GexCon AS is used. The FLACS 
code is a three-dimensional transient finite-volume CFD 
program used to simulate gas dispersion and explosion 
events (FLACS, 2014). 
 
Figure 10 shows the target module and extent of analysis 
for dispersion. A ground area at the bottom of the 
structure also needs to be modelled to reflect the ground 
effect. The extent of the analysis is much wider than the 
structure size of 20 x 15 x 9 (m), thus taking into account 
the effects of turbulence associated with environmental 
conditions such as wind speed and direction. 
 
x
y
z
 
Figure 10: Target structure and extent of analysis for 
dispersion simulations 
 
 
A gas composition of LNG, which is processed in FLNG 
operation is applied. Table 1 shows the gas composition 
of LNG. 
 
Table 1: Gas composition of LNG 
Component Mole fraction (%) 
Methane 88.1 
Ethane 5.0 
Propane 4.9 
Butane 1.8 
Pentane 0.1 
Nitrogen 0.1 
Total 100 
 
In the case of gas dispersion, it is recommended that the 
grid size around the leak be used, as per Eq. (1) (FLACS, 
2014). 
 
     ACV < 2Aleak                           (1) 
 
where ACV = the minimum area around the leak position, 
and Aleak = the area of the leak. 
 
Figure 11 presents examples of applied dispersion grids 
in association with leak direction. 
x y
z
 
x y
z
 
(a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 3 
Figure 11: Examples of applied dispersion grids 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the relationship between the 
maximum flammable and equivalent gas cloud volumes, 
which are the results of gas dispersion simulations. The 
flammable gas cloud signifies the actual gas cloud in the 
range of combustion, which is between the lower 
flammable limit and upper flammable limit. The 
equivalent gas cloud is the idealized gas cloud that has an 
equivalent ratio equal to 1. 
 
The equivalent gas cloud is generally proportional to the size 
of the flammable gas cloud. They also have a relationship 
with the function of the flammable or equivalent gas cloud. In 
this study, the sizes of equivalent gas cloud are almost half of 
the flammable gas cloud volumes. 
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Figure 12: Relationship between the maximum 
flammable and equivalent gas clouds 
 
 
The size of the equivalent gas cloud and the centre of the 
flammable gas cloud are used as the variables for 
selecting gas explosion scenarios. 
 
 
4.1 (b) Selection of Gas Explosion Scenarios and 
Simulations 
 
When selecting gas explosion scenarios, all possible 
parameters that can have an effect on gas explosion 
should be considered, as in the selection of gas 
dispersion scenarios. Hydrocarbon explosions can be 
affected by dispersion-related parameters, which are size, 
location, concentration of gas clouds and ignition point. 
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In this study, equivalent gas clouds are used, and four 
parameters, i.e. size of the gas cloud and the centre of the 
gas cloud in the X, Y and Z directions, are considered in 
selecting the gas explosion scenarios. Fifty gas explosion 
scenarios selected using the method proposed by Paik 
and Czujko (2010) are shown in Table A.2. 
 
Figure 13 shows the extent of analysis for explosion 
simulations in the FLACS. Although the area of analysis 
for the dispersion simulation is very wide, the explosion 
simulation requires a smaller area because there is no 
wind, and the blast wave allows the boundary effect to be 
ignored. The extent of analysis adopted to investigate the 
explosion loads is 80 x 65 x 40 (m). 
 
x
y
z
 
Figure 13: Target structure and extent of analysis for 
explosion simulations 
 
 
For the gas explosion simulation, there is no need to 
generate fine grids around the leak area because the 
equivalent gas cloud is considered without gas release. 
The minimum grid size recommended for use is the value 
calculated by Eq. (2) (FLACS, 2014). 
 
max.CV=0.1[Vgas
1/3
]             (2) 
 
where max.CV = maximum size of the CV and Vgas = size 
of gas cloud volume. 
 
To minimise the effect of the size of the CVs (grids), a 
distance between the grids of 0.5 m is used for all 
explosion scenarios. The total number of CVs is 565,192. 
Figure 14 presents the applied grids for gas explosion 
simulations used in all explosion scenarios. 
 
x y
z
 
Figure 14: Applied grids and control volumes for 
explosion simulations 
Figure 15 illustrates a representative result of gas explosion 
simulations, which is the effect of the equivalent gas cloud 
volume size on maximum overpressure in the entire 
monitoring region. 
 
It shows that the size of the gas cloud volume can have a 
decisive effect on the explosion loads when the volume is less 
than 1000m
3
. When the gas cloud is larger than 1000m
3
, 
conditions of geometry such as congestion and confinement 
affect the explosion loads more than the size of gas cloud. 
 
In the entire monitoring region
 
Figure 15: Effect of equivalent gas cloud volume on 
maximum overpressure 
 
The explosion loads for each scenario obtained from 
CFD simulations are directly applied to the structural 
model for structural consequence analysis. 
 
 
4.2 CALCULATION OF GAS EXPLOSION 
FREQUENCY 
 
To generate the consequence exceedance curve and 
structural assessment proposed in the present study, the 
frequency of gas explosion scenarios should be 
calculated, which can be done with Eq. (3). 
 
[Explosion fre.]=[Gas cloud fre.]x[Ignition prob.] (3) 
 
 
4.2 (a) Gas Cloud Frequency 
 
In the case of fire accidents, the leak frequency can be 
directly used. However, the gas cloud frequency in the 
case of an explosion must be recalculated from the 
release frequency because the explosion necessarily 
occurs after the release of the gas. 
 
The detailed steps for the calculation of gas cloud 
frequency are as follows: 
 
1) Categorisation of gas cloud volume. 
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2) Summation of release frequency of gas dispersion 
scenarios depending on categories. 
3) Calculation of the number of explosion scenarios 
included in each category. 
4) Calculation of the gas cloud frequency of each 
scenario (total frequency/number of explosion 
scenarios in each category). 
 
In this study, 25% probability is adopted to define the 
interval for categorisation. Table 2 shows the frequency 
of gas cloud explosion scenarios. 
 
Table 2: Frequency of gas cloud explosion scenarios 
No. 
Gas cloud 
frequency (/yr) 
No. 
Gas cloud 
frequency (/yr) 
1 2.14E-3 26 2.14E-3 
2 7.45E-3 27 2.92E-3 
3 2.92E-3 28 7.45E-3 
4 2.92E-3 29 2.14E-3 
5 2.14E-3 30 5.03E-3 
6 2.92E-3 31 5.03E-3 
7 2.92E-3 32 2.92E-3 
8 7.45E-3 33 7.45E-3 
9 7.45E-3 34 7.45E-3 
10 2.92E-3 35 2.92E-3 
11 2.14E-3 36 2.14E-3 
12 5.03E-3 37 5.03E-3 
13 2.92E-3 38 7.45E-3 
14 2.92E-3 39 5.03E-3 
15 7.45E-3 40 5.03E-3 
16 5.03E-3 41 2.92E-3 
17 2.14E-3 42 2.14E-3 
18 2.92E-3 43 2.14E-3 
19 7.45E-3 44 2.92E-3 
20 7.45E-3 45 2.14E-3 
21 5.03E-3 46 2.92E-3 
22 7.45E-3 47 7.45E-3 
23 7.45E-3 48 7.45E-3 
24 5.03E-3 49 7.45E-3 
25 2.14E-3 50 7.45E-3 
 
 
4.2 (b) Ignition Probability 
 
Cox et al. (1990), Oil and Gas UK (2006) and OGP 
(2010) suggest ignition models for the hydrocarbon 
events on offshore installations. The ignition probability 
suggested by OGP has largely referred to the Oil and Gas 
UK model (OGP, 2010). 
 
The ignition probability is generally related to release 
type (gas, liquid, etc.), leak rate and type of offshore 
structure. In this study, the ignition probability of an 
offshore gas release event is considered. Figure 16 shows 
the ignition probabilities of gas release on offshore 
installations. Among the ignition models, the ignition 
probability proposed by OGP (2010) is applied in this 
study because it calculates the ignition probability in 
detail. The probability can be expressed by Eq. (4). 
OGP
0.1113 log( x ) 2.8857       for 0.1 x<1
log( IP ) 1.2143 log( x ) 2.8865       for 1 x<50
0.15                                      for 50 x<1000
  

   
   
(4) 
 
where IPOGP = ignition probability suggested by OGP, 
and x = leak rate. 
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Figure 16: Ignition probabilities depending on the leak rate 
 
 
Table 3: Ignition probability depending on the leak rate 
of gas dispersion scenarios 
No. 
Ignition 
probability 
No. 
Ignition 
probability 
1 1.46E-5 26 1.46E-5 
2 5.10E-5 27 2.00E-5 
3 2.00E-5 28 5.10E-5 
4 2.00E-5 29 1.46E-5 
5 1.46E-5 30 3.44E-5 
6 2.00E-5 31 3.44E-5 
7 2.00E-5 32 2.00E-5 
8 5.10E-5 33 5.10E-5 
9 5.10E-5 34 5.10E-5 
10 2.00E-5 35 2.00E-5 
11 1.46E-5 36 1.46E-5 
12 3.44E-5 37 3.44E-5 
13 2.00E-5 38 5.10E-5 
14 2.00E-5 39 3.44E-5 
15 5.10E-5 40 3.44E-5 
16 3.44E-5 41 2.00E-5 
17 1.46E-5 42 1.46E-5 
18 2.00E-5 43 1.46E-5 
19 5.10E-5 44 2.00E-5 
20 5.10E-5 45 1.46E-5 
21 3.44E-5 46 2.00E-5 
22 5.10E-5 47 5.10E-5 
23 5.10E-5 48 5.10E-5 
24 3.44E-5 49 5.10E-5 
25 1.46E-5 50 5.10E-5 
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Table 3 shows the ignition probability for each of the gas 
dispersion scenarios. The ignition probability of gas 
dispersion scenarios cannot be directly used in the gas 
explosion scenarios because the latter are re-selected 
with the results of gas dispersion simulations. Thus, the 
total ignition probability of gas dispersions divided by 50 
(6.84E-3 for each scenario) is equally used for the gas 
explosion scenarios. 
 
4.2 (c) Gas Explosion Frequency 
 
Given the gas cloud frequency and ignition probability, 
the gas explosion frequency can be calculated. Table 4 
shows the gas explosion frequency for each gas 
explosion scenario. 
 
Table 4: Gas explosion frequency of explosion scenarios 
No. 
Gas explosion 
frequency (/yr) 
No. 
Gas explosion 
frequency (/yr) 
1 1.46E-5 26 1.46E-5 
2 5.10E-5 27 2.00E-5 
3 2.00E-5 28 5.10E-5 
4 2.00E-5 29 1.46E-5 
5 1.46E-5 30 3.44E-5 
6 2.00E-5 31 3.44E-5 
7 2.00E-5 32 2.00E-5 
8 5.10E-5 33 5.10E-5 
9 5.10E-5 34 5.10E-5 
10 2.00E-5 35 2.00E-5 
11 1.46E-5 36 1.46E-5 
12 3.44E-5 37 3.44E-5 
13 2.00E-5 38 5.10E-5 
14 2.00E-5 39 3.44E-5 
15 5.10E-5 40 3.44E-5 
16 3.44E-5 41 2.00E-5 
17 1.46E-5 42 1.46E-5 
18 2.00E-5 43 1.46E-5 
19 5.10E-5 44 2.00E-5 
20 5.10E-5 45 1.46E-5 
21 3.44E-5 46 2.00E-5 
22 5.10E-5 47 5.10E-5 
23 5.10E-5 48 5.10E-5 
24 3.44E-5 49 5.10E-5 
25 1.46E-5 50 5.10E-5 
 
4.3  NONLINEAR STRUCTURAL 
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
 
4.3 (a) Finite Element Modelling 
 
Numerical model 
 
The target structure for finite element analysis is the 
same as that in the model for dispersion and explosion 
simulations. The entire module is used for the extent of 
analysis as shown in Figure 17. 
 
The finite element model is generated using the 
ANSYS/LS-DYNA with shell elements (Shell 163) for 
the entire structure including the plates, blast wall, beams 
and columns. Shell 163 element in ANSYS/LS-DYNA is 
a 4-node element with both bending and membrane 
capabilities, and both in-plane and normal loads are 
permitted (ANSYS/LS-DYNA, 2014). Thus, it is proper 
for use in structural analysis under dynamic loads.  
 
 
Figure 17: Finite element model of the target structure 
 
Material modelling 
 
All of the members involved in the present study are 
made of mild steel. Table 5 shows the material properties 
of mild steel under static load. 
Table 5: Material properties of mild steel under static load 
Density (ρ, kg/m3) 7,890 
Elastic modulus (E, MPa) 205,800 
Yield stress (σY, MPa) 235 
Poisson’s ratio (ν) 0.3 
Fracture strain (εf) 0.3 
Cowper-Symonds coefficients 
C (1/s) 40.4 
q 5 
 
When a dynamic load is applied in the form of an 
explosion load, the strain rate effect, which is a dynamic 
effect, should be considered. There are various methods 
for considering the dynamic effect of the material. The 
standard methods apply the DLF (Biggs, 1964), SDOF 
(Biggs, 1964; Paik, 2011), or Cowper-Symonds 
equations (Cowper and Symonds, 1957). 
 
The DLF is generally used to amplify the structural 
response under static load. SDOF is a simple method for 
calculating the response of a simplified structure as a 
spring. These two methods are efficient and convenient, 
but they yield only approximate results and are not 
suitable for complex structures such as the target 
structure in this study 
 
Therefore, Cowper-Symonds equations are used to obtain 
a more accurate structural response. The equations are 
expressed as in Eq. (5), depending on the strain (Cowper 
and Symonds, 1957). They can be applied to the elastic, 
perfectly plastic material model applied in this study. 
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  
    
  
1/ q
Yd Y 1
C

    (5a) 
1/ q
fd f 1
C

 

  
    
  
  (5b) 
 
where σY and σYd = static and dynamic yield stresses,   = 
strain rate, C and q = Cowper-Symonds coefficients and, 
εf and εfd = static and dynamic fracture strains. 
 
Boundary conditions 
 
In general, the topside structures on offshore installations 
are fixed at support members on the deck of the hull side. 
However, there is no rotational restriction. 
 
Among the six degrees of freedom in NLFEM, a fixed 
condition with three displacements is applied at the 
bottom of the main columns. Figure 18 shows the 
boundary conditions adopted in the present study. 
 
X-Z plan Y-Z plan
UX=UY=UZ=fixed, RX=RY=RZ=free,  
Figure 18: Applied boundary conditions 
 
 
Loading conditions 
 
Paik et al. (2014) suggested that the actual explosion 
loads be applied by CFD or experimentation because the 
structural behaviour is quite different according to the 
usage of idealised (uniformly distributed) and actual 
(non-uniformly distributed) explosion loads. The 
procedure applies the actual explosion loads transferred 
by the interface program between the CFD and finite 
element analysis for structural analysis subjected to 
actual explosion loads. 
 
In this study, the FLACS2DYNA (2013) interface 
program is adopted to transfer the actual explosion loads 
obtained from FLACS CFD simulations to the 
ANSYS/LS-DYNA NLFEM. FLACS2DYNA transfers 
the explosion loads taking into account the CV system in 
CFD and the elements in NLFEM. 
 
Control volume:
(FLACS)
Shell element:
(ANSYS/ LS-DYNA)  
Figure 19: Concept of the FLACS2DYNA interface 
program (FLACS2DYNA, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 20: Mapping view of explosion loads between 
CVs in CFD and elements in FEM 
 
Figures 19 and 20 illustrate the concept of the 
FLACS2DYNA interface program and the mapping view 
of explosion loads between CVs in FLACS and elements 
in ANSYS/LS-DYNA (FLACS2DYNA, 2013). 
 
Mesh sensitivity study 
 
For effectiveness and accuracy, a part of the deck is used 
for the mesh sensitivity study on deflection, and a part of 
the blast wall is applied for plastic strain as shown in 
Figure 21. 
 
  
(a) Part of deck (b) Part of blast wall 
Figure 21: Extent of analysis and loading directions for 
the mesh sensitivity study 
 
 
Figure 22 presents the results of the mesh sensitivity 
study. From the results, an element of 150 x 150 (mm) 
is selected as the proper mesh size in terms of time 
and accuracy. 
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Figure 22: Results of the mesh sensitivity study 
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Obtaining the structural response 
 
Deflection and plastic strain are investigated as the 
elements of structural response. The deflections are 
observed at the centre of the plate members, which are 
the blast wall and the upper and process decks, and the 
strains are obtained at structural members such as the 
main frame, secondary frames, column and blast wall. 
Figure 23 depicts the monitoring points and elements 
used to obtain the structural response, and Table 6 lists 
the location of each monitoring element. 
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(a) Monitoring points for obtaining deflection 
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(b) Monitoring elements for obtaining plastic strain 
Figure 23: Obtaining the structural response 
 
 
Table 6: Location of monitoring elements 
Point no. Location Note 
A Centre 
Blast 
wall 
B Connection (mezzanine deck) 
C Connection (process deck) 
D Main frame Upper 
deck E Secondary frame 
F Main frame Process 
deck G Secondary frame 
H Column at upper deck - 
 
 
4.3 (b) Nonlinear Structural Response of the Topside 
Structure 
 
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the results of structural analysis, 
which are maximum deflection at the blast wall and decks, 
and plastic strain at the blast wall, frames and column. 
 
In Figure 24, deflections at process deck are larger than 
responses at blast wall and process decks due to the 
direction of self-weight and equipment. 
 
As shown in Figure 25(a), the plastic strain at the connection 
between the blast wall and the process deck is bigger on the 
blast wall because the target structure in this study does not 
have a support member between the blast wall and the decks. 
This indicates that the support member is needed for 
structural safety of the connection. The response of the main 
and secondary frames on the process and upper decks, as 
shown in Figures 25(b) and (c), signify that the explosion has 
a more serious effect on the main frames. 
 
 
Center of blast wall
Center of upper deck
Center of process deck
A: Center of blast wall
B: Connection between blast wall and mezzanine deck
C: Connection between blast wall and process deck
 
Figure 24: Maximum deflection at the centre of the blast 
wall and decks 
 
A: Center of blast wall
B: Connection between blast wall and mezzanine deck
C: Connection between blast wall and process deck
 
(a) On blast wall 
D: Main frame on upper deck
E: Secondary frame on upper deck
 
(b) On upper deck 
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F: Main frame on process deck
G: Secondary frame on process deck
 
(c) On process deck 
H: Column at upper deck
 
(d) At column 
Figure 25: Maximum plastic strain at blast wall, frames 
and column 
 
 
Figure 26 gives an example of total displacement 
distributions in a representative explosion scenario 
(scenario 10) at different times. It shows that an 
additional torsional behaviour occurs as a result of non-
uniformly distributed actual explosion loads. 
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(a) 0.1 s after ignition (b) 0.3 s after ignition 
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(e) 0.9 s after ignition (f) 1.1 s after ignition 
Figure 26: Example of total displacement distribution in 
explosion scenario 10 
 
Detailed maximum deflections and plastic strains 
subjected to actual explosion load sets of 50 explosion 
scenarios are presented in Tables A.3 and A.4. 
 
 
4.4 STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT 
 
4.4 (a) Consequence Exceedance Curve 
 
Czujko and Paik (2015) suggested a new method for the 
accidental limit design of structures subjected to 
hydrocarbon explosions, in which the explosion loads 
and structural consequence are combined with the 
consequence probability of exceedance. The procedure 
adopts a new method as named ‘consequence exceedance 
curve’ based on the method proposed by Czujko and Paik 
(2015) for structural assessment. 
 
Using the results of 50 nonlinear structural analyses, the 
consequence exceedance curves are generated. The 
approach to obtaining these curves is similar to that for 
the explosion load exceedance curve proposed by Paik 
and Czujko (2010). Structural responses such as 
deflection or strain can be used instead of explosion 
loads, which are overpressure, drag force and impulse. 
 
Figure 27 shows the maximum structural consequence 
exceedance curves at the blast wall, decks, frames and 
column. Figure 27(a) presents the maximum deflection 
exceedance curves, and Figures 27(b)-(e) illustrate the 
maximum plastic strain exceedance curves at the 
structural members. 
 
The consequence exceedance curves are for investigating 
the structural response at risk acceptance level. With the 
curves, designers can now more accurately predict the 
structural response directly relating to the actual loads of 
all explosion scenarios. 
 
4.4 (b) Structural Consequence at Risk Acceptance Level 
 
Plastic strain is the parameter generally used for 
structural assessment in explosions, and it is applied to 
define the structural consequence at the acceptance level. 
 
A risk level of 10
-4
/yr is adopted as acceptable in this 
study, and Table 7 shows the plastic strain at risk 
acceptance level in the consequence exceedance curves 
shown in Figures 27(b)-(e). 
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Table 7: Plastic strain at a risk acceptance level of 10
-4
/yr 
in consequence exceedance curves (in %) 
Location 
Plastic strain at risk 
acceptance level 
Blast 
wall 
Centre 0.41 
Connection 
(mezzanine deck) 
2.24 
Connection 
(process deck) 
0.64 
Upper 
deck 
Main frame 0.15 
Secondary frame 0.00 
Process 
deck 
Main frame 1.66 
Secondary frame 0.57 
Column at upper deck 3.97 
 
4.4 (c) Structural Assessment of the Topside Structure 
 
Acceptance criteria are needed for the structural 
assessment of the topside structure. These criteria are 
normally determined according to a functional 
requirement (Czujko and Paik, 2015). Czujko and Paik 
(2015) suggested the criteria of 1%, 5% and 10% of the 
plastic strain limit for the structural assessment of the 
topside structure. 
 
In this study, 1% and 5% of plastic strain limits are 
adopted for the structural assessment. Additionally, 3% 
of strain is applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
Center of blast wall
Center of upper deck
Center of process deck
Sce. 39
Sce. 43Explosion scenario 39
Sce. 25
 
(a) Maximum deflection at blast wall and decks 
Point A: Center of blast wall
Point B: Connection between blast wall and mezzanine deck
Point C: Connection between blast wall and process deck
Explosion scenario 16
Sce. 39
Sce. 39
Sce. 40
Sce. 5
Sce. 16
 
Point D: Main frame on upper deck
Point E: Secondary frame on upper deck
Explosion scenario 29
Sce. 16
 
(b) Maximum plastic strain at blast wall (c) Maximum plastic strain at upper deck 
Point F: Main frame on process deck
Point G: Secondary frame on process deck
Explosion scenario 5
Sce. 39
Sce. 37
Sce. 25
 
Point H: Column at upper deck
Explosion scenario 5
Sce. 39
 
(d) Maximum plastic strain at process deck (e) Maximum plastic strain at column 
Figure 27: Probability exceedance of explosion frequency versus maximum structural consequence 
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Table 8: Structural assessment of topside structure with 
risk acceptance level 
Location 
Plastic strain 
1% 3% 5% 
Blast 
wall 
Centre A A A 
Connection 
(mezzanine deck) 
NA A A 
Connection 
(process deck) 
A A A 
Upper 
deck 
Main frame A A A 
Secondary frame A A A 
Process 
deck 
Main frame NA A A 
Secondary frame A A A 
Column at upper deck NA NA A 
Note: A signifies acceptable, and NA signifies not 
acceptable. 
 
Table 8 shows whether the structural response satisfies 
the criteria. Some structures subjected to actual loads do 
not satisfy the 1% of plastic strain limit. With Table 8, 
the structural safety can be accurately evaluated because 
the consequence exceedance curves consider the actual 
(non-idealized and non-uniform) explosion loads. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objectives of this study were to develop an advanced 
procedure for the quantitative risk assessment of offshore 
installations in hydrocarbon explosions by applying an 
entirely probabilistic approach and to demonstrate the 
procedure with an applied example. 
 
The procedure selects gas dispersion and explosion 
scenarios based on the probabilistic method, and CFD 
and/or experimental tests are used to simulate dispersion 
and explosions. 
 
For the structural consequence analysis, this procedure 
directly applies actual explosion loads to a structural 
model using the interface program between CFD and 
NLFEM. In addition, the consequence exceedance curve 
based on the structural response under actual explosion 
loads and explosion frequency is suggested for the 
structural assessment of topside structures. 
 
The following conclusions and insights can be drawn 
from the results of this study: 
 
 The advanced procedure proposed here is practicable 
by using a fully probabilistic approach for explosion 
risk assessment of offshore installations. 
 It can produce a realistic structural response using 
the actual explosion loads and shell element in the 
finite element model. 
 The procedure adopts a method for structural 
assessment using consequence exceedance curves, 
which consider sets of actual explosion loads of all 
explosion scenarios. 
 The procedure can be easily applied to any structure 
against explosion events and can reduce the 
uncertainties inherent in the assessment of explosion 
loads and structures. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Fifty selected gas dispersion scenarios 
No. 
Wind Leak 
Dir. (°) 
Speed 
(m/s) 
Rate 
(kg/s) 
Dir. 
Position (m) 
X Y Z 
1 67.8 5.9  2.17 -Y 8.5  6.1  0.6  
2 192.5 1.2  0.35  X 8.8  6.0  2.4  
3 202.1 2.4  0.09  -Z 8.6  6.0  4.0  
4 49.5 2.0  0.93  Z 8.5  6.4  6.6  
5 59.1 3.2  5.81  -X 11.7  9.0  0.4  
6 295.1 4.9  13.91  -X 11.6  5.8  0.5  
7 83.1 2.9  0.31  -X 14.4  12.0  3.1  
8 159.7 4.1  1.23  X 5.8  6.0  1.6  
9 238.4 2.8  1.35  -Z 5.6  9.0  5.0  
10 331.0 5.6  3.24  -Z 11.5  6.0  8.2  
11 222.1 2.6  7.75  -Y 11.4  3.6  4.3  
12 102.7 4.7  0.43  -X 8.5  9.0  5.1  
13 125.2 1.8  0.13  -X 17.7  3.0  3.5  
14 108.6 3.6  0.12  Y 2.5  3.0  2.6  
15 183.1 1.6  18.81  -Z 2.5  5.9  0.3  
16 232.8 0.8  0.70  Z 5.5  3.0  2.9  
17 286.1 1.3  0.28  Y 8.5  2.9  6.9  
18 317.0 1.9  9.15  Y 8.4  3.3  3.8  
19 135.5 2.3  0.38  Y 5.5  12.1  8.2  
20 150.2 5.1  31.24  X 6.1  2.9  4.6  
21 96.5  3.5  0.22  Z 5.5  6.0  0.9  
22 119.8 3.0  2.64  Y 11.5  3.3  7.4  
23 140.5 2.5  1.48  Z 11.5  6.0  8.1  
24 305.3 5.2  0.20  -X 2.6  9.0  7.8  
25 277.8 3.9  1.12  Y 17.5  11.8  3.7  
26 173.8 3.1  6.67  -Y 2.5  5.7  2.1  
27 227.3 3.4  0.25  -Z 14.4  6.0  5.7  
28 216.9 6.1  0.85  Z 5.5  6.0  4.0  
29 270.3 2.9  2.92  -Y 5.4  8.7  6.4  
30 207.0 3.8  0.17  Z 5.5  6.0  8.7  
31 169.1 1.5  0.10  -X 5.6  9.0  1.7  
32 38.5  3.3  0.58  X 5.6  9.0  7.3  
33 130.4 4.8  0.07  Y 2.5  12.1  6.8  
34 178.5 4.2  0.05  X 5.4  3.0  4.1  
35 75.7 4.3  0.52  -Z 11.5  6.0  4.2  
36 197.3 7.0  1.79  Z 2.5  3.0  2.1  
37 9.6  4.4  1.97  -Y 8.5  11.6  6.1  
38 25.6  5.4  0.64  -Y 8.5  3.3  0.3  
39 349.0  0.5  0.15  Y 8.5  3.0  1.0  
40 256.5  3.7  1.02  -X 14.7  9.0  3.3  
41 211.9  1.7  4.03  -Y 8.5  8.9  6.3  
42 263.2  2.2  4.53  -X 11.5  3.0  1.3  
43 164.4  4.6  1.63  -Z 17.5  12.0  7.8  
44 244.2  6.5  0.06  Z 2.5  9.0  2.8  
45 250.2  2.1  0.47  X 6.4  9.0  7.1  
46 155.0  1.0  5.11  -Y 8.5  8.9  7.1  
47 114.3  2.7  11.07  -Z 2.7  9.0  2.1  
48 187.8  8.1  2.39  X 2.4  6.0  5.7  
49 145.4  4.0  3.61  -Z 14.5  9.0  7.2  
50 90.0  3.5  0.77  -X 8.8  9.0  1.2  
 
 
 
Table A.2: Fifty selected gas explosion scenarios 
No. Size of gas cloud (m
3
) 
Centre of gas cloud (m) 
X Y Z 
1 624.1 5.8 3.3 4.9 
2 2.9 5.2 7.8 1.8 
3 342.6 5.6 4.7 4.6 
4 322.7 3.8 6.7 0.9 
5 518.6 10.2 10.1 6.3 
6 165.3 0.3 8.8 4.5 
7 363.6 12.4 11.8 4.1 
8 106.6 15.1 0.3 1.5 
9 85.9 4.2 10.6 3.1 
10 268.3 11.4 4.3 3.9 
11 409.1 4.6 8.7 3.5 
12 821.4 14.6 5.3 8.8 
13 285.6 7.6 9.8 4.0 
14 152.7 9.7 5.8 4.7 
15 66.6 1.4 8.3 9.4 
16 1059.6 7.2 7.1 3.7 
17 460.3 2.2 8.5 5.6 
18 303.7 15.7 5.6 5.2 
19 140.6 18.7 6.1 2.5 
20 128.9 2.8 2.0 8.3 
21 1570.5 14.2 2.5 3.2 
22 9.4 6.4 7.4 5.3 
23 96.1 10.6 11.3 6.8 
24 965.9 6.7 2.9 4.2 
25 665.9 11.6 10.3 1.6 
26 385.7 8.3 6.3 2.3 
27 178.3 9.0 4.1 2.4 
28 76.1 9.9 12.3 1.9 
29 433.9 4.9 9.0 6.0 
30 887.9 13.4 5.5 3.3 
31 1334.1 17.3 6.0 3.6 
32 191.9 3.3 13.1 1.2 
33 24.0 12.7 7.5 7.9 
34 31.8 8.8 4.5 2.8 
35 220.6 7.4 8.1 4.3 
36 551.0 10.9 7.2 3.4 
37 2050.7 9.2 6.6 6.2 
38 117.6 6.1 6.9 3.0 
39 1177.2 6.9 6.4 5.0 
40 763.3 7.9 9.6 2.0 
41 235.8 13.8 7.7 1.3 
42 586.0 9.5 3.6 7.6 
43 712.0 8.1 10.9 7.3 
44 205.9 10.4 9.4 2.7 
45 488.4 11.9 4.9 5.8 
46 251.7 12.2 5.1 2.6 
47 48.6 13.1 1.4 2.2 
48 16.4 11.1 9.2 7.0 
49 57.4 8.6 8.0 6.6 
50 40.0 16.3 3.8 5.5 
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Table A.3: Maximum deflection at the centre of the blast wall and decks subjected to actual explosion loads (in mm) 
Scenario 
No. 
Blast 
wall 
Upper 
deck 
Process 
deck 
Scenario 
No. 
Blast 
wall 
Upper 
deck 
Process 
deck 
Scenario 
No. 
Blast 
wall 
Upper 
deck 
Process 
deck 
1 51.8 12.3 21.8 18 25.7 4.8 11.7 35 25.2 6.3 15.6 
2 1.8 3.0 3.3 19 4.5 2.6 4.6 36 47.5 10.6 20.6 
3 50.0 10.3 22.0 20 7.7 1.6 3.4 37 327.5 180.0 353.3 
4 36.8 16.2 14.9 21 77.1 13.9 34.3 38 23.4 4.8 10.7 
5 216.0 118.0 198.3 22 4.1 0.8 1.5 39 320.0 46.9 252.0 
6 5.2 2.5 5.0 23 11.6 7.4 11.0 40 190.0 27.9 91.8 
7 41.5 25.8 22.0 24 54.3 13.7 10.7 41 15.9 9.1 11.5 
8 4.7 1.5 2.6 25 168.0 32.5 101.0 42 82.6 17.2 47.5 
9 14.0 3.1 6.0 26 51.0 9.3 25.0 43 308.0 263.0 370.0 
10 30.2 6.4 14.2 27 23.3 6.6 14.3 44 30.5 9.0 20.1 
11 74.0 13.9 38.1 28 10.4 4.7 6.1 45 139.0 23.8 83.1 
12 154.0 28.6 252.0 29 115.0 19.5 56.2 46 29.2 7.6 15.6 
13 40.8 9.1 25.7 30 156.0 16.3 38.9 47 7.8 2.4 4.0 
14 24.5 7.3 16.1 31 72.1 10.2 29.3 48 8.4 4.4 8.1 
15 2.1 0.8 1.2 32 22.2 8.2 11.7 49 21.7 4.8 7.4 
16 224.0 25.4 91.6 33 12.3 5.2 10.2 50 11.7 2.5 5.8 
17 27.2 4.8 10.9 34 10.1 3.9 7.1     
 
Table A.4: Maximum plastic strain at the blast wall, frames and column subjected to actual explosion loads (in %) 
Scenario No. 
Blast wall Upper deck Process deck Column 
A B C D E F G H 
1 - - - - - - - 0.94 
3 - - - - - - - 0.95 
4 - - - - - - - 0.44 
5 0.40 3.98 2.16 1.75 0.71 1.56 1.14 3.95 
7 - - - - - - - 0.45 
10 - - - - - - - 0.10 
11 - 0.09 - - - - - 1.58 
12 0.05 3.11 1.22 0.17 - 2.18 1.87 2.11 
13 - - - - - - - 0.43 
14 - - - - - - - 0.09 
16 0.43 2.02 0.32 0.16 - 0.21 0.02 4.23 
17 - - - - - - - 0.19 
18 - - - - - - - 0.06 
21 - 0.11 - - - - - 1.32 
23 - - - - - - - 0.44 
24 - - - - - - - 0.50 
25 - 0.84 0.24 - - 0.11 0.07 2.36 
26 - - - - - - - 0.56 
27 - - - - - - - 0.28 
29 - 0.92 0.14 0.13 - 0.10 - 2.28 
30 - 0.94 0.23 - - - - 2.31 
31 - 0.14 - - - - - 1.28 
32 - - - - - - - 0.15 
35 - - - - - - - 0.16 
36 - - - - - - - 0.25 
37 0.71 6.15 1.83 0.01 0.16 4.18 0.84 3.38 
38 - - - - - - - 0.05 
39 0.08 2.36 0.79 0.18 - 1.78 1.70 4.04 
40 - 1.23 0.36 0.13 - 0.15 0.03 2.36 
42 - 0.41 0.03 - - - - 1.83 
43 1.76 7.26 3.15 2.48 2.00 5.36 1.21 4.56 
44 - - - - - - - 0.17 
45 - 1.51 0.25 0.12 - 0.19 0.02 2.46 
46 - - - - - - - 0.08 
*Note: There is no plastic strain in the un-noted scenarios in Table A.4. 
 
